The views expressed in papers published in our series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of any department at SBM, the SBM itself, the American University of Sharjah (AUS) and/or any of their affiliates. Additionally, all papers in the series are made available on an "as is" basis without warranties of any kind. We, that is, the relevant department at SBM, SBM, AUS and/or any of the affiliates, hereby expressly disclaim any warranties of any kind, whether expressed or implied, including without limitation, the warranties of noninfringement, merchantability, and fitness for a particular purpose. Furthermore, we offer no warranties, expressed or implied, regarding the accuracy, sufficiency or suitability of the material found in the published papers. The users have the sole responsibility for inspecting and testing all content to their satisfaction before using them. 
Introduction
Research and development (R&D) investment can generate new strategic options for business organizations (Bowman and Hurry 1993) and provide a source of competitive advantage (Lev and Sougiannis 1996) . However, the empirical evidence with respect to R&D investment and future performance is mixed. Some studies (Johnson 1967; Chan et al. 2001; Artes 2009) detect no relationship between R&D investments and subsequent firm performance, while others (Lev et al. 2006; Chan et al. 2001; Sougiannis 1994; Shevlin 1991) find that R&D investments increase a firm's market value. Returns on R&D investments exhibit substantial variation across firms (Aral and Weill 2007) , even after controlling for organizational characteristics and industry level variation. The uncertainty surrounding R&D investments, combined with the growing pressure to create and sustain competitive advantages, underlines the need of business organizations to effectively manage their R&D activities (Bone and Saxon 2000) .
In this paper, we examine the role of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and information technology (IT) leadership to the success of R&D activities. Both IT professionals and academics suggest that R&D productivity may be influenced by the CIO and IT management practices. For example, Gartner EXP research director, Andy Rowsell-Jones, included technology development (R&D, technology tracking, and prototyping) as one of four key responsibilities of CIOs.
1 Similarly, when discussing the CIO's role in enabling innovation in 2007, Rebecca Jacoby, Chief Information Officer for Cisco, points out that, "Leading 1 http://www.gartner.com/press_releases/pr30sept2003a.html.
2 organizations recognize that the strategic deployment of technology can be the critical enabler of virtually every business growth opportunity, especially those fueled by innovation." 2 Yayla and Hu (2008) provide empirical evidence that, in the view of boards of directors,
CIOs play a critical role in enhancing R&D productivity. In a study of CIO compensation over 1993 to 2005, the authors find a significant positive association between industry-level R&D intensity and CIO compensation, suggesting that boards of directors perceive that a CIO's value to an organization is increasing with the importance of R&D to a firm's success. Weill and Aral (2005) find that firms classified as IT savvy have more innovation from strategic IT initiatives (i.e., those designed to create growth through new products, new markets, etc.) 3 In a review of the literature that examines the link between economic performance and information technology, Dedrick et al. (2003) point out that IT has the greatest impact on firm performance through its effect on coordination that "enables fundamental changes in business processes and organizational structures . . . ." (p.6).
In this paper, we examine the association between appointments to newly-created CIO positions and R&D productivity. We predict that first-time CIO appointments will improve strategic IT management and, in turn, will result in an increase in the productivity of R&D investments. We focus on first-time CIO appointments because a CIO appointment at the topmanagement level represents a commitment to strategic IT management which should help ensure that information technology is well-integrated with other functions inside the organization and effective in supporting an organization's strategy (Medcof 2008) . We focus on R&D productivity because strategic IT activities, in the sense of Weill and Aral (2005) , should support the development and success of new products and markets. More broadly, in a knowledge-based 3 economy, R&D activities and supporting strategic IT initiatives are critical to obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage. Finally, by focusing on R&D productivity, and controlling for other factors that affect firm performance, we can at least partially avoid the effects of other events and circumstances that might confound the association between strategic IT initiatives and broader measures of firm performance.
To identify whether and how first-time CIO appointments are associated with R&D productivity in the long-term, this study examines the change in R&D productivity in the three years following the CIO appointment. We control for firm size and industry performance because both factors could potentially affect R&D productivity. We find that the productivity of R&D activities increases following the first-time appointment of a CIO. Moreover, we find that capital markets price the productivity improvements as if they are relatively permanent. Our results illustrate how IT management can affect the success of R&D activities.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the effect of newly-appointed CIOs on the subsequent productivity of innovative activities. The lack of research is somewhat surprising given the perception that the CIO is important, if not critical, to the likelihood of garnering strategic value from IT. Thus, this paper fills a gap in the literature that is relevant to academics and practitioners. In summary, this study advances our understanding of the impact of strategic changes in IT management on R&D productivity and also contributes to the literature that investigates the impact of R&D on firm performance. While prior research focuses primarily on the valuation implications of R&D investments, we argue that IT management is an important driver for productivity enhancement and we propose that the productivity of R&D investments relies heavily on factors such as expertise and know-how of the IT management team. The 4 appointment of a CIO is expected to provide firms with the knowledge and expertise needed to better manage R&D activities.
Background

Relation to Prior Research
Much of the prior research uses IT announcements as a focal point when measuring the return on IT investments, primarily due to the lack of public information about actual IT investments at the firm level. Two different methodologies are used to examine the return on IT investments, i.e., market returns surrounding IT investment announcements and long-term accounting performance following those announcements. While the market reaction to IT investment announcements provides insight into whether these investments are value-relevant to shareholders, accounting return measures in the years following IT investment announcements determine whether these investments are, in fact, long term value-adding.
As exceptions to the above line of research, Kobelsky et al. (2008) and Aral and Weill (2007) use budgetary data for IT investments to measure whether these investments pay off. Kobelsky et al. (2008) use IT budget data to examine the determinants and consequences of firms' IT budgets. However, IT budget data is only available for Information Week 500 firms (IW 500) and is available only for the period from 1991 to 1997. Since the IW 500 focuses on large firms that are recognized for their innovative use of IT resources, the data is unlikely to be representative of all public firms. Aral and Weill (2007) survey senior IT executives of 147 U.S firms to solicit input from participants on the components of IT investments during 1999-2002.
The data are not available for larger sample firms, and it is vulnerable to respondents' subjective assessments and subject to single respondent bias.
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In summary, previous research that has examined the payoff from IT investments has relied on public announcement of IT investments or privately gathered surveys on IT spending.
The lack of public data about IT investments for a large sample of firms has been the primary limiting factor for research in this area, and may be one reason for the mixed results found in studies of returns to IT investments. Furthermore, research that measures the impact of IT investments on firm performance, in general, equates potentially heterogeneous IT investments by focusing on the aggregate IT investments and not differentiating among the different types of IT activities (Bhatt and Grover 2005 ; Wade and Hulland 2004) . By not distinguishing between different types of IT activities, Carr (2003) comes to a conclusion that firms cannot gain a competitive advantage from their investments in IT, and he encourages managers to avoid or take a defensive posture as regard to the high cost of IT leadership.
Our goal in this paper is to sharpen the theoretical perspective of IT resources by unpacking one major type of IT investment (i.e., strategic IT investment) and measure its association with on aspect of firm performance following the appointment of CIO. Of the four types of IT investments (Weill and Aral 2005) , we choose to focus on the strategic IT investment because strategic IT contributes directly to product innovation that influences a firm's ability to sustain a competitive advantage (Bhatt and Grover 2005; Artz et al. 2003; Caves and Ghemawat 1992) . Strategic IT investments evolve over time and are the product of knowledge and expertise that is not easily duplicated by competitors. Yet, empirical evidence about the effect of IT expertise on the productivity of strategic IT investments is limited. We view a first-time CIO appointment as a strategic change in IT management that should enhance R&D productivity 6
Market Reaction to CIO Appointments
CIOs are expected to add value to business organizations by facilitating interactions with other chief executive officers and enhancing the strategic role of IT (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999; Feeney et al. 1992) . Firms appoint a CIO with the expectation that the CIO will lead the company to achieve a competitive advantage through better management of IT implementation 4 and by improving strategic decisions at the firm level. Prior research finds that the appointment of a new CIO is associated with an increase in the market value of the appointing firm (on average) around the announcement date. Chatterjee et al. (2001) find that the market's reacts favorably to announcements of newly-created CIO positions over 1987-1998 and that the reaction is more pronounced in firms that are newly integrating IT into their business strategy. In related research, Guan et al. (2006) reexamine the sample used in Chatterjee et al. These short-window market reaction tests suggest that capital market participants believe that new CIO positions signal favorable changes in IT strategy and that high quality appointees enhance the probability of effectively implementing new or existing strategies. However, the stock returns around announcements of CIO appointments provide no direct evidence on whether the market reaction is an accurate indication of firms' long-term performance following CIO appointments. In a companion paper, Khallaf and Skantz (2010) examine long-term accounting performance subsequent to the CIO announcements. Their results suggest that the decision to create and fill a new CIO position erases prior poor performance and that first movers enjoy higher financial performance following CIO appointments than later appointing firms.
R&D, IT Investments and Firm Performance
Studies of the impact of R&D and IT investments on firm performance are very similar in terms of direction and focus. Some studies show mixed results (Johnson 1967; Chan et al. 2001) , while others detect a positive relationship between each type of investment and firm performance or firm value (Kobelsky et al. 2008; Lev and Sougiannis 1996) . Kobelsky et al. (2008) use IT budget data and find a positive relationship between IT investments and subsequent firm profitability. Similarly, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) detect a positive relationship between R&D expenditures and subsequent accounting returns.
In combining of the above lines of research, Shin (1997) Most firms have access to similar IT resources but are not equally effective in utilizing information technology for strategic purposes (Barua et al. 1995; Barua et al. 2008 ). Achieving returns above the industry average requires matching a firm's investment in IT-related activities with management capabilities (Weill and Aral 2005) . Decisions on strategic IT activities require thorough understanding about organizational processes and competitive situation.
It would be quite surprising if firm's investments (whether in IT, R&D, manufacturing assets, etc.) were not, on average, positively associated with firm performance. Evidence that R&D and IT investments generate returns that beat industry averages is consistent with project evaluation using discounted cash flow criteria, wherein proposals are accepted only if they promise returns in excess of the opportunity cost of capital (i.e., positive net present value projects). This paper tests whether returns to R&D investments are higher after appointing a new CIO than before. Under the assumption that R&D investments are, on average, positive net present value projects, this paper effectively tests whether the excess returns associated with R&D investments increase after appointing CIOs for the first time.
Research Hypotheses
Weill and Ross (2004) study IT governance in over 250 organizations in 23 countries and find that top-performers manage IT activities differently than their weaker competitors. The authors conclude that effective IT management allows organizations to achieve superior results on their IT investments. Bharadwaj (2000) argues that effective IT management enables a firm to incorporate IT strategy into each department's planning process and to design future IT strategies that build on innovation faster than competitors.
Of the four types of IT activities (infrastructure, transactional, informational and strategic as discussed below), strategic activities provide applications associated with product innovative (Aral and Weill 2007) . Since R&D activities are designed to create knowledge that leads to new products, new markets, new technologies, or other sources of competitive advantage, we use R&D expenditures as a proxy for investment in options on knowledge-based assets. This view is consistent with the primary objective of R&D activities, i.e., acquiring new knowledge that fosters the development of new products, services or processes (Tsang et al. 2008 ).
Prior research finds that firms employing IT as a strategy for competitive advantage outperform their competitors (Bharadwaj 2000; Dehning and Stratopoulos 2002) and that organizational capabilities moderate the relationship between investment in IT activities and firm performance (Brynjolfsson and Yang 1997; Bharadwaj 2000) . Tanriverdi (2005) surveys senior IT executives of 250 Fortune 1000 firms and finds a significant indirect impact on firm performance through the moderation of knowledge capability. Similarly, Dehning et al. (2003) argue that the lack of a significant association between IT investments and firm performance could be attributed to the poor management of information and technology.
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Organizations are expected to align their investments in strategic IT activities with their technological capabilities and their IT management practices (newly-created CIO positions). We rely on Aral and Weill's (2007) description of IT investments to develop a theoretical model of factors influencing the productivity of R&D. As shown in Figure 1 , knowledge management affects the productivity of R&D investments. We explain the theory behind figure 1 in the following sections as we develop our hypotheses. First, we describe the four types of IT investments and their objectives. Then, we discuss the impact of knowledge management on R&D productivity.
Types of IT Investments
Aral and Weill (2007) packaged software" (Bhatt and Grover 2005, 270) . IT infrastructure has been described in prior research as an effective source of value and not a source of competitive advantage (Bharadwaj 2000; Broadbent et al. 1999 ).
Investments in the basic IT activities (infrastructure, transactional, and informational) are necessary to support IT service in response to competitors' investment in similar IT activities (Barua et al. 1995) . Bhatt and Grover (2005) argue that when established firms capitalize on similar sets of resources, those resources will be available either in the marketplace or become easy to duplicate by competitors. The authors find no significant relationship between higher quality IT infrastructure and competitive advantage, supporting the conjecture that investment in IT infrastructure maintains parity rather than contributes to sustainable superior performance.
Strategic IT activities, as opposed to more fundamental IT activities, are the instruments needed to implement business strategies and improve a firm's competitive position in the market place (Aral and Weill 2007; Hallikainen et al. 2002) . To improve its competitive position, a firm invests in IT activities beyond those devoted for building the infrastructure for IT services. Aral and Weill (2007) argue that strategic IT activities are likely to provide a sustainable competitive advantage by supporting entry into new markets, and developing new products, services or business processes. From an economic perspective, Caves and Ghemawat (1992) examine the factors that lead to intra-industry profit differentials and find that differentiation-related strategies (which include R&D) are indicative of innovation in the product market and, accordingly, play a more essential role than cost-related strategies.
Knowledge Management and R&D Productivity
Economic theory argues that knowledge is an essential driver of firm value. Machlup (1962) documents the shift in US economy from industrial to knowledge-based, and argues that while the success in an industrial economy depends on tangible inputs, the success in our modern economy relies on investments in assets such as expertise and know-how. Such shifts in market demand have been driven in large part by IT management (Autor et al. 1998 ).
DeFond et al. (2009) study the stock market reaction and future performance of companies that are to receive a "Most Admired Knowledge Enterprise" (MAKE) award. MAKE winners are selected by panels of knowledge-management experts that include a CIO as one of the key members. The panels identify firms that utilize knowledge management to create firm value. The MAKE award is a proxy for superior knowledge-management capabilities. The authors find that award winners experience positive abnormal returns around the award announcement and achieve superior operating performance relative to their peers following the MAKE awards. These findings are consistent with economic theory that argues that knowledge is a fundamental driver of firm value. In the strategic management literature, knowledgemanagement capability is difficult to imitate and therefore can provide the firm with a long-term competitive advantage (Nonaka 1991) . Barriers to the transfer and replication of knowledge lend credence to its strategic importance (Alavi and Leidner 1999) .
According to this perspective, firms create value through knowledge management by combining and applying resources to produce new products or embrace new technologies. This perspective extends the resources-based view of the firm (Alavi and Leidner 1999) . In particular, knowledge management is central to product and process innovation (Eral 2001) . Because knowledge management is critical to R&D productivity, we predict that an effective strategic IT 13 backbone will readily enhance returns from R&D activities. Using data drawn from a broad global sample of major chemicals firms, Roberts and Bellotti (2002) demonstrate that firms adopting specific management for their technology strategies enjoy higher overall R&D productivity. Berson and Linton (2005) argue that R&D success depends mainly on effective leadership. The interaction between IT business strategy and innovation suggests that R&D leadership provides sustained profit differentials across firms (Lev et al. 2006 ). Uttal et al.
(1992) discuss three levels of technology leadership for the CIO --functional, strategic and supra functional. While the purpose of functional leadership is to ensure the effective operation of R&D, the strategic leadership aims to ensure that R&D and corporate strategies are aligned, and supra functional emphasizes the process of developing a strategy in all areas of operations and not just for the technology function. The strategic importance of technology for a firm determines the degree of the CIO involvement in managing R&D activities.
14 An appointment to a newly-created CIO position suggests a change in the strategic importance of IT management to the appointing firm. A strategic shift with respect to IT management is less likely when a firm is making a second or later appointment to an existing position. Chatterjee et al. (2001) argue that IT leadership differentiates firms' IT capabilities. The authors find that the market rewards firms when they create a CIO position for the first time.
If new CIOs represent an increased commitment to strategic IT initiatives, R&D investments (i.e., call options on new products and processes) are more likely to mature into valuable claims to new products and processes (i.e., finish in the money). Consequently, firms that appoint a CIO to a new position are expected to experience an improvement in their R&D productivity relative to their own pre-appointment performance. Thus, we predict that R&D productivity will increase following first-time CIO appointments. Hence, the first hypothesis is:
H1: R&D productivity will increase following the appointment of a CIO to a new position.
The Market's Valuation of R&D Productivity
In addition to examining changes in R&D productivity following the creation of a new CIO position, we examine the market's interpretation of those productivity changes. The reason for this latter analysis is to examine whether improvements in accounting performance translate into increases in market value or whether changes in accounting performance are dismissed by the market as temporary. If share price reflects improvements in R&D productivity, we can conclude more confidently that the market views the changes in performance as a valid indicator that newly-appointed CIOs provide a sustainable competitive advantage. Because we view the appointment of a first CIO as a strategic repositioning of IT, we predict that the market will value 15 firm performance and R&D investments following the appointment of a first CIO as much as or more firm performance before the appointment of the new CIO. Our second hypothesis is:
H2: The market will value firm performance and R&D investments following the appointment of a CIO to a new position as much as or more than before the appointment. The accounting performance of each sample firm is measured relative to the industry median performance. Measuring changes in firm performance following the CIO appointment 7 The initial CIO sample is the same one used in Khallaf and Skantz (2007 We use the global industry classification standard (GICS) to define industry subgroups.
Sample Selection and
Industry classifications created using GICS explain a considerably greater proportion of the cross-sectional variations in firm level return measures than industry classifications produced on the basis of SIC, NAICS, or Fama-French (Bhojraj et al. 2003) . The GICS system classifies firms according to their major business activities and forms homogeneous sub-industries that have similar operating characteristics (Bhojraj et al. 2003) . We use the full 8-digit GIC code, which corresponds to 123 different industry subgroups. A firm must have at least 10 firms in its industry in any year to be retained in our tests. 
Performance Measures
One advantage of using accounting-based returns to assess the impact of changes in IT management on firm performance is that accounting returns are largely independent of the dramatic market shifts occurring during our sample period. In particular, the market bubble of the late 1990's and subsequent correction in late 2000 and early 2001 are unlikely to be related to firm-specific choices.
Accounting-based performance measures have been widely used to examine the impact of IT investments on firm performance (Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Bharadwaj 2000) .
Various profitability measures are possible, including return on assets (ROA), return on book equity (ROE), and return on market capitalization. We use ROA as a performance measure 17 because that measure is important in financial analysis and in prior IT research. Studies analyzing long-term performance find a positive link between investment in IT and ROA (e.g., Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Bharadwaj 2000) . Since the benefits of appointing a new CIO include improved firm operating efficiency and profitability, we purposely focus on ROA as it incorporates both factors. Our measure of return on assets is based on earnings before taxes, interest, and depreciation (Compustat's OIBDP) rather than net income. 10 We use an operating return measure of firm performance because operating returns are unaffected by financing choices, tax management practices, and depreciation policies. We do not believe that financing decisions, tax management, or deprecation policy is likely to be affected by strategic IT decisions.
Regression models
Hypothesis 1
Our regression models include mean industry performance as an independent variable to control for systematic factors that affect all firms in an industry and that are unrelated to CIO appointments. H1 predicts that the productivity of knowledge-based assets (R&D investments) and the contribution of those assets to firm performance will improve following the CIO appointment. The new CIO is predicted to be important in reshaping knowledge management which in turn should increase the productivity of investments in knowledge-based assets.
Accordingly, we structure regression models to examine whether a specific slice of firm performance is improved after bringing a new CIO into the top management group. The test of H1 uses R&D spending as a proxy for investment in knowledge-based assets. The regression model used to test H1 is as follows:
10 Bold, upper case characters are used to refer to Compustat variable acronyms.
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ROA it = α + β 1 mdROA it + β 2 logMV it + β 3 POST it + β 4 RD it + β 5 POST it *RD it + FE t + ε it (1) ROA (return on assets) is firm performance in year t, found as income before interest, taxes and depreciation (Compustat item, OIBDP) divided by average total assets (AT). mdROA is the industry median ROA over the firm's fiscal year. LogMV is the natural log of firm market value, where market value is measured as fiscal year-end stock price (PRCC_F) multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding (CSHO) at year end. The market value of a firm is included in the model to control for the effect of size on ROA. POST is a dummy variable equal to 1 for fiscal years t=1, t=2 and t=3 following the CIO appointment, and 0 for years t=-3, t=-2, and t=-1. The year of the CIO appointment is omitted from regression models. POST is included as an independent variable to capture the change in firm performance following the CIO appointment. RD is research and development expenditure (XRD) scaled by average total assets.
We scale by average total assets to be consistent with the scaling used to measure firm performance (ROA). The coefficient for POST*RD tests whether IT management capability moderates the relationship between investments in knowledge-based assets and firm performance. FE represents indicator variables to capture year fixed effects. We include year fixed effects to isolate changes in the level of ROA over time. Year fixed effects are potentially important because our sample period includes a bubble period when corporate earnings and stock prices are unusually high and a later recession period when the opposite is true. H1 predicts that β 5 > 0.
In robustness tests, we use the sum of advertising (XAD) and R&D expenditures (XRD) as a proxy for investment in knowledge-based assets. Advertising expenditures include product promotion and brand development; both of those activities may lead to intangible assets (Lev and Sougiannis 1996) . Moreover, improved IT may increase the productivity of advertising activities by more quickly identifying successful and unsuccessful promotion and development programs.
Hypothesis 2
H1 predicts that R&D productivity increases following a first-time CIO appointment.
Even if H1 is confirmed, however, the findings would not indicate whether productivity increases are priced by the market. If R&D productivity enhancements are expected to persist --as would be expected if a competitive advantage were obtained --the market should value R&D investments in the post-appointment period at least as much as R&D investments in the preappointment period. Our second hypothesis predicts that R&D investments in the postappointment period will be valued at least as much as pre-appointment R&D investments. Thus, our second set of tests examine whether statistically significant R&D productivity improvements carry economic significance with respect to stock price effects.
To investigate the market's perception of R&D productivity improvements, we use the following regression model:
BHAR it = α + POST it + λ 1 *PRE it *ROAia it + λ 2 *POST*ROAia it + + λ 3 *logMV it + λ 4 *CAPEXia it + λ 5 *PRE it *RDia it + λ 6 *POST it *RDia it + FE t + ε it (2) BHAR it is the buy and hold abnormal return, found as the buy and hold raw return for firm i over fiscal year t less the return during that same year for firms in the same market capitalization decile. ROAia is industry adjusted return on assets, found as ROA less the median ROA for a firm's industry in the same fiscal year. CAPEXia is industry-adjusted capital expenditures, found as CAPEX less the industry median CAPEX for the corresponding fiscal year. PRE is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the pre-appointment window and 0 otherwise. RDia is industry- We include firms' industry-adjusted return on assets (ROAia) in the model because R&D productivity improvements are ultimately reflected in ROA. The model compares the association between abnormal stock returns (BHAR) and unexpected return on assets (ROAia) and unexpected R&D investments (RDia), before and after a CIO is appointed. The intuition underlying the model is that abnormal stock returns should reflect unexpected ROA and unexpected R&D investments but not normal, or expected, ROA and R&D investments. If the market assigns a higher valuation multiple to unexpected asset returns and R&D investments in the post-appointment period than in the pre-appointment period, we have strong evidence that the market perceives post-appointment R&D investments to be more productive and persistent than pre-appointment R&D investments. H2 predicts that λ 2 ≥ λ 1 and λ 6 ≥ λ 5 .
In summary, if the market views a new CIO as securing a competitive advantage for their firm with respect to R&D investments, the coefficient λ 6 will be positive and significant. A positive coefficient suggests that the market finds R&D investments to be 'value relevant.' Also, if the market believes that post-appointment R&D investments are more valuable than preappointment R&D investments, then λ 6 should be larger than λ 5 . A large valuation multiple for R&D investments is consistent with a perception that a new CIO appointment secures a sustainable competitive advantage. assets is effective at eliminating size effects.
21
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Productivity of Knowledge Assets
In this paper, we focus, primarily, on whether a new CIO affects the productivity of a relatively small slice of total assets, i.e., investments in knowledge assets. Table 3 (model 1) provides strong support for H1 which predicts that the productivity of R&D investments will improve after the appointment of a new CIO. The negative coefficient on RD (-0.241) is expected due to the mechanical effect of immediate expensing of R&D expenditures on accounting earnings. As R&D spending increases, contemporaneous pre-tax earnings and ROA will necessarily decline, absent any productivity effects. 12 The most critical variable in the model is the interaction term, POST*RD. As predicted by H1, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive (+0.387) and significant (two-tailed p-value = 0.043). 13 On average, the coefficient on RD increases from -0.241, before the CIO appointment, to +0.146 after the CIO appointment.
One interpretation of the positive coefficient for RD after appointing a first-time CIO is that payoffs from R&D spending are realized contemporaneous with expenditures. This interpretation would suggest a very quick payback to R&D spending. A second interpretation, and one that is more reasonable in our view, is that R&D spending is relatively "sticky." Under this interpretation, the positive association between ROA and contemporaneous R&D spending after the CIO appointment reflects (improved) current returns to previous years' investments in 12 If the only effect were a mechanical accounting effect, the coefficient on RD would be equal to -1. Offsetting productivity effects can explain why the coefficient on RD is greater than -1.0. 13 All p-values are two-tailed.
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R&D. This latter interpretation would also explain why the coefficient on current year R&D spending prior to the CIO appointment is -0.241 rather than -1.0, which is the expected value of the coefficient given the pure mechanical effect on pre-tax ROA from spending $1 on R&D. In any event, the productivity of R&D investments (expenditures) increases significantly following the appointment of a first-time CIO. This is strong evidence that the strategic changes that are implied by creating a new CIO position benefit the firm by increasing the return on R&D investments. While we cannot conclude that integrating CIO positions into the top management team enhances the productivity of physical IT investments, we can conclude that there are spillovers into R&D productivity. Table 3 (model 2) repeats the analysis using RDADV (the sum of R&D and advertising expenditures, scaled by average total assets) in the place of RD. Improved IT management is likely to increase the productivity of advertising activities by more quickly identifying successful and unsuccessful promotion and development programs. The interaction term POST*RDADV is positive and significant (p-value = 0.048), suggesting, again, that the productivity of investments in knowledge-based assets improves following the CIO appointment.
In table 4, we add capital expenditures, CAPEX, and the interaction term, POST*CAPEX, to models 1 and 2 from table 3. Our motivation behind this revised model is to examine whether the association between ROA and R&D expenditures, before and after the CIO appointment, is the result of firms spending more on R&D when profitability is relatively strong.
If that is the case, we would expect to see a similar association between capital expenditures and ROA. As shown in table 4, the coefficient on CAPEX is positive and significant in both models.
This positive coefficient is not surprising because more profitable firms are likely to have a larger set of positive net present value projects than less profitable firms. By contrast, the 24 coefficient on the interaction term, POST*CAPEX, is positive but statistically insignificant (pvalues = 0.245 and 0.313 in models 1 and 2, respectively). We also find that the coefficients on POST*RD and POST*RDADV achieve a higher statistical significance in variables. The similarity of the results in tables 4 and 5 are consistent with 'sticky' level of R&D and advertising over time for a firm. Table 6 reports findings for our second hypothesis which examines the market's valuation of R&D investments. H2 predicts that the market will value post-appointment period R&D investments more than pre-announcement investments. Ideally, we would use measures of the productivity of R&D in each of our two sample windows by isolating the component of ROA that can be attributed each year to R&D investments. However, there is no reliable way to measure R&D productivity at the individual firm level. As an alternative, we compare the market's valuation of ROA and R&D spending in the pre-and post-appointment periods. If R&D productivity increases over the two periods and if that productivity increase is perceived by the market as persistent, we would expect the market to value R&D spending in the postappointment period more than in the pre-announcement period. If the realized productivity, as reflected in ROA, is at least as persistent in the post-appointment as the pre-appointment period, we would expect the market to value ROA in the post-appointment period at least as highly as in the pre-appointment period.
Market's Perception of R&D Investments
Because we examine the market's perception of the sustainability of RD productivity without specifically modeling the productivity component of those expenditures, the coefficients λ 5 for R&D investments in the pre-announcement period and λ 6 for R&D investments in the post-announcement period capture the joint effects of the perceived productivity of R&D expenditures and the market's valuation multiple for that (unknown) productivity coefficient.
The valuation multiples for R&D and ROA are increasing functions of the market's perception of the persistence of the productivity coefficient.
Because the productivity of RD expenditures must eventually affect ROA, Table 6 , column (1), compares the pre-and post-appointment valuation of unexpected ROA. We find the coefficient on unexpected ROA is statistically significant in the post-appointment period but not the pre-announcement period. The valuation coefficient for the unexpected ROA in the postannouncement period is positive and significant (p-value = 0.002). And, the difference between the pre-and post-appointment coefficients for unexpected ROA is marginally significant (pvalue = 0.087, untabulated). The evidence suggests that the market views ROA as at least as persistent in the post-appointment period as in the pre-appointment period. We cannot, of course,
be certain of what portion of ROA, if any, is related to R&D productivity. Thus, we are unable to make strong statements about how changes in R&D productivity contributed to the market's perception of the persistence of ROA in the post-appointment period. Table 6 , column (2), adds unexpected R&D expenditures, RDia, as an independent variable to the model in column (1). We find that the coefficients for unexpected ROA and There is weak evidence that the valuation coefficients for ROA and R&D both increase post-appointment. In model 2, the difference between the pre-and post-appointment coefficients for unexpected ROA is marginally significant (p-value = 0.043, untabulated). However, the difference between coefficients over the two periods for unexpected R&D fails to reach the conventional level of significance (p-value = 0.139, untabulated) . Thus, while abnormal market returns are more closely associated with unexpected R&D investments after the new CIO appointment than before, the valuation multiple for R&D investments is not significantly different when comparing the pre-and post-appointment periods. On balance, our findings support the assertion that new CIO appointments represent strategic changes in IT management that favorably affect firm value. We believe that the low statistical significance for the change in the market's valuation of R&D investments after the CIO appointment is partially due to the fact that we are unable to isolate the component of ROA that represents the incremental ROA from improved productivity of R&D activities following the CIO appointment.
Conclusions and Avenues for Further Research
This paper examines whether and how strategic changes to IT management affect firm performance. We find that the productivity of R&D investments is significantly improved following the appointment of a new CIO. We also find that the market's assessment of the economic value of R&D investments is at least as high after the appointment as before.
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Our findings suggest two broad conclusions. First, to understand the impact of IT investments on firm performance, it is important to consider the role of IT management capability. Second, the impact of IT investments on firm performance may flow from improved productivity of investments which are not directly related to IT.
There are a number of avenues for further research. One possibility would be to devise more reliable measures of the productivity of knowledge-based assets, including measures that capture the long run benefits of current R&D expenditures at the firm level. Another extension would be to use data about IT investments in models similar to those used in this paper as a way to test for direct changes in the productivity of IT when new CIOs are appointed. Also, given the long-standing nature of the IT productivity paradox, it would be useful to see whether alternative 'slices' of firm performance allow one to identify productivity effects from changes in IT strategy. Finally, it would be interesting to examine whether the likelihood that the appointment of a CIO will achieve a competitive advantage is affected by the quality of the appointed CIO. BHAR is the buy and hold abnormal return, found as the buy and hold raw stock return (RETURN) for firm i over fiscal year t less the value-weighted stock return during that same year for all firms in the same market-value size-decile as firm i. Stock return data is from CRSP. All other variables are from COMPUSTAT (in bold font). ROA is firm performance measured by operating return on assets, found as income before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Compustat item, OIBDP) divided by average total assets (AT). mdROA is the industry median ROA. POST = 1 for fiscal years t=+1, +2, and +3 following the CIO appointment, and 0 for years t=-3, -2, and -1 prior to the appointment, where t = 0 is the appointment year. RD is the ratio of a firm's research and development expenditure (XRD) to average total assets. ADV is the ratio of a firm's advertising expenditure (XAD) to average total assets. RDADV is the ratio of the sum of a firm's research and development (XRD) plus advertising expenditures (XAD) to average total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by average total assets. logMV is the natural log of firm market value, where market value is measured as a fiscal year-end stock price (PRCC_F) multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding (CSHO) at fiscal year-end. Year fixed effects yes yes
Significant at two-tailed p-value: *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01
All variables are from COMPUSTAT (in bold font). ROA is firm performance measured by operating return on assets, found as income before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Compustat item, OIBDP) divided by average total assets (AT). mdROA is the industry median ROA over a firm's fiscal year. logMV is the natural log of a firm's market value, where market value is measured as a firm's fiscal year-end stock price (PRCC_F) multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding (CSHO) at fiscal year-end. POST = 1 for fiscal years t=+1, +2, and +3 following the CIO appointment, and 0 for years t=-3, -2, and -1 prior to the appointment, where t = 0 is the appointment year. RD is the ratio of a firm's research and development expenditure (XRD) to average total assets. ADV is the ratio of a firm's advertising expenditure (XAD) to average total assets. RDADV is the ratio of the sum of a firm's research and development (XRD) plus advertising expenditures (XAD) to average total assets. Year fixed effects yes yes
All variables are from COMPUSTAT (in bold font). ROA is firm performance measured by operating return on assets, found as income before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Compustat item, OIBDP) divided by average total assets (AT). mdROA is the industry median ROA over a firm's fiscal year. logMV is the natural log of a firm's market value, where market value is measured as a firm's fiscal year-end stock price (PRCC_F) multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding (CSHO) at fiscal year-end. POST = 1 for fiscal years t=+1, +2, and +3 following the CIO appointment, and 0 for years t=-3, -2, and -1 prior to the appointment, where t = 0 is the appointment year. CAPEX is capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by average total assets. RD is the ratio of a firm's research and development expenditure (XRD) to average total assets. ADV is the ratio of a firm's advertising expenditure (XAD) to average total assets. RDADV is the ratio of the sum of a firm's research and development (XRD) plus advertising expenditures (XAD) to average total assets. Table 5 R&D productivity following CIO appointments as reflected in return on assets (ROA), using lagged (by one year) R&D expenditures as a proxy for R&D investment in model 1, and the sum of lagged R&D and lagged advertising expenditures as a proxy for R&D investment in model 2. Both models control for capital expenditures. Year fixed effects yes yes
All variables are from COMPUSTAT (in bold font). ROA is firm performance measured by operating return on assets, found as income before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Compustat item, OIBDP) divided by average total assets (AT). mdROA is the industry median ROA. logMV is the natural log of firm market value, where market value is measured as a fiscal year-end stock price (PRCC_F) multiplied by the number of common shares 38 outstanding (CSHO) at fiscal year-end. POST = 1 for fiscal years t=+1, +2, and +3 following the CIO appointment, and 0 for years t=-3, -2, and -1 prior to the appointment, where t = 0 is the appointment year. CAPEX is capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by average total assets. RD is the ratio of a firm's research and development expenditure (XRD) to average total assets. ADV is the ratio of a firm's advertising expenditure (XAD) to average total assets. RDADV is the ratio of the sum of a firm's research and development (XRD) plus advertising expenditures (XAD) to average total assets.
Table 6
The market's perception of the sustainability of ROA and the productivity of R&D following CIO appointments Year fixed effects yes yes
Significant at two-tailed p-value: *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01 BHAR is the buy and hold abnormal return for firm i, found as the buy and hold raw return for firm i over its fiscal year t less the value-weighted buy-and-hold stock return for firms in the same size decile as firm i over the same time period. All return data are from CRSP. All other variables are from COMPUSTAT (in bold font). ROA is firm performance measured by operating return on assets, found as income before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Compustat item, OIBDP) divided by average total assets (AT). ROAia is the industry-adjusted return on assets, found a firm i's ROA less the industry median ROA for the corresponding fiscal year. logMV is the natural log of firm market value, where market value is measured as a fiscal year-end stock price (PRCC_F) multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding (CSHO) at fiscal year-end. POST = 1 for fiscal years t=+1, +2, and +3 following the CIO appointment, and 0 for years t=-3, -2, and -1 prior to the appointment, where t = 0 is the appointment year. CAPEXia is CAPEX, as defined earlier, less industry median CAPEX for the corresponding fiscal year. RDia is the industry-adjusted research and development expenditure found as a firm's R&D expenditures (XRD) scaled by the firm's sales (SALE) less the corresponding fiscal year's industry median R&D expenditures scaled by sales.
